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Opportunistic Claiming Behavior in Two-sided Market
Xinyan Liu1, Wenyan Zhou2, Silu Yu3, Li Zhao4一
School of Business Administration, Zhongnan University of Economics and Law, China
Abstract: Although consumer opportunistic behavior has drawn attention from managers and scholars for a long
time, a special context of two-sided market has been ignored. A multi-stage research program, comprising in
depth interviews (Study 1) and three experimental studies (Studies 2, 3, 4), explored opportunistic claiming
during service guarantee. The main characteristics of two-sided market (consumer, platform and reference group)
are considered in this paper. The findings are as follows: 1) consumers with higher level of Machiavellianism are
more likely to claim in an opportunistic manner. 2) The reasonable compensation would evoke the desire for
cheating behavior for Low Machs, while reduce the probability of opportunistic claiming behavior for High
Machs. Both platform attitude and reference group only have significant effects on Low Machs. Specifically, 3)
platform with tolerant attitude would face to more opportunistic claims and 4) reference group’s opportunistic
manners would misguide others to do so.

Keywords: Opportunistic claiming behavior, Service guarantee, Two-sided market

1.

INTRODUCTION
Bi Sheng, chief executive of online shoe company Letao.com, complaint that one million pairs of shoes

were sold in 2010, while more than 100,000 consumers return. “People sent these shoes back during 30-day
warranty period with the excuses like wearing inappropriate, but these shoes had already worn for a month. ” he
said. Opportunistic behavior also appears frequently in the largest two-sided platform (www. taobao.com) in
China, for examples, freight insurance deception (purchase and return several goods by one-time delivery but
using the dividing return process to gain multiple shipping compensation), “ward robing” (e.g., the purchase,
use and return of clothing[1]) and cheating on service guarantees[2].
Consumer’s opportunistic behavior brings severe damages especially for the small and medium-sized
sellers. Firstly, the higher return rate would lead to the lower search ranking and bad reputation. Secondly, more
stock and working capital are required to maintain daily operation

[3]

. Additionally, the manual process of

returning is complicated, so labor costs would increase at the same time [4].
Therefore, there is one often most debated and controversial argument that weather or not to provide
service guarantees with less restricted condition. Theoretically, service recovery is an effective way to attract
new customers and to retain the goodwill of customers who experience a service failure

[5]

. But, practically,

many enterprises believe non-ethical behavior of consumers will bring financial and managerial dilemma.
2.

LITERATURE REVIEW
Increasing researches start to focus on the dysfunctional and deviant customer behavior

can be called jay customer behavior

[8]

. The cheating returns and complaining

[1] [9]

[6] [7]

, which also

involved in this consumer

opportunistic claiming are a subset and are related to service guarantee.
However, prior literature largely approached the field in the traditional context such as hotel chain
restaurant

[11]

, and department store

[12]

[10]

,

. Our study extends this line of enquiry by exploring customer’s

opportunistic behavior in the context of two-sided market. We consider two-sided market on the perspectives of
一
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three components: the two-sided users (consumer themselves and sellers) and the platform owner
2.1 opportunistic claiming behavior
Opportunistic is one kind of unethical behavior, which refers to pursuing self-interest with guile or taking
advantage of opportunities as they appear. During this process, the opportunists are regardless to principles or
consequence , but are keen on what can rather than what should be done in a context . In the service guarantee
context, an opportunist has been described as someone who “may not be a chronic gold digger, but rather just
someone who recognizes an opportunity to take financial advantage of a company’s service failure and recovery
efforts” [13].
The primary cause of opportunistic behavior is information asymmetry which people use to misguide or
distort the truth. This phenomenon reflects that selfish and self-central inheres in human nature. But not all the
individuals will take this kind of behavior when they handling interpersonal conflicts, it can be controlled or
[14]

influences by several factors

: 1) environment factors including industry background, economic development,

law system and culture , and 2) personal characteristics including Machiavellianism in this paper
country and organization

[16]

and moral intensity

[15]

, culture of

[17]

.

2.2 service guarantee
Service guarantee refers to an explicit promise made by the service provider to (a) deliver a certain level of
service to satisfy the customer and (b) remunerate the customer if the service is not sufficiently delivered

[18]

.

Service guarantee originally aims to cover the gap of information asymmetry and enhance satisfaction with
recovery

[19]

. Yet, as the information era come, this gap is changed and customers take a relatively passive role

especially in the field of compensation sought.
On the perspective of designing, the level of compensation is quite crucial. Previous researches focus more
on the pro-purchase behavior. Some of them indicate a positive effect of a greater amount of compensation on
the purchase intention, while others hold the point that the overcompensation (i.e., more than 100% of the value
of the service) may not

[20]

. Nevertheless, currently scholars pay more attention to post-purchase behavior

whereby consumer knowingly and incorrectly report service failures or make illegitimate complaints

[9]

,

showing that greater compensation lead to higher opportunistic rate, because buyers can benefit from such
behavior, while overcompensation can avoid the opportunistic claiming via bringing a sense of guilty to some
extent

[21]

.

All in all, service recovery policies are open to abuse

[22]

, but the relationship between compensation and

opportunistic claiming behavior has not yet formed a unified conclusion especially in the context of two-sided
market.
2.3 two-sided market
Two-sided market refers to the kind of market in which one platform enable interactions between end-users,
and try to get the two sides “on board” by effectively marketing and management strategies

[23]

. So the buyers’

opportunistic behavior is not only affected by marketing strategies adopted by sellers but also by the
management and service offered by platform makers and the other buyers in the same side.
Although the issue about consumer opportunistic behavior is so important to managers, the service
recovery literature is largely silent on this field in the context of two-sided market. The present study beginning
to address this gap by exploring the three questions as follows:
� What is the suitable compensation of service recovery to avoid opportunistic claiming behavior;
� What attitude platform should have towards user’s opportunistic claiming behavior;
� How the reference group in the same platform influence other consumer’s opportunistic claiming behavior.
3.

CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORL AND HYPOTHESES
For the consumer themselves, Machiavellianism is a typical characteristic being used in exploring unethical
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behavior. The concept is used to describe a person's tendency to be emotionally cool and detached, and thus
more able to detach from conventional morality and as well to deceive and manipulate others. Rawwas, Vitell
and Al-Khatib (1994) empirical researched the consumers in Lebanon and got the conclusion that the higher
Machs, the greater likelihood of opportunistic behavior was

[24]

, while Erffimcyer, Keillor and Thorne Lechair

(1999) draw similar conclusion in the study for Japan.
H1:

Consumer with high-level Machiavellianism is more likely to claim in an opportunistic manner.

There are so many differences between different levels in Machiavellianism

[25]

.The MACH-IV test we used

to measuring a person's level of Machiavellianism was developed by Christie and Florence L. Geis in the 1960s.
People scoring high on the scale (we call High Machs in this paper) may be able to understand and know others
better, but they cannot understand emotional clues such as guilt, shame or sympathy

[26]

. As a result, the ones

with lower score (we call Low Machs in this paper) may generate more guilt when facing greater generous
guarantee, and see more risks when facing minimal generous guarantee, so reasonable compensation would
make them more confortable to consider about opportunistic claiming behavior. On the opposite, High Machs
are not sensitive to risks and guilt, so they will pursue the extra interests through opportunistic claims.
a: Low Machs are more likely to claim opportunistically when they are offered reasonable compensation.
H2
H2a:
H2b: High Machs are less likely to claim opportunistically when they are offered reasonable compensation.
For reference group, the effects of word-of-mouth (WOM) are documented to be significant on member
growth in the Internet context compared with the traditional one, as there are more channels to receive
information such as forum, community and review system
groups are more frequently and last longer

[27]

. Consequently, the interaction between user

[28]

. Moreover, Scholars like Chevalier and Mayzlin (2006) had

proved that the negative WOM had more propagation effect on the purchase decision , in other words, consumer
would believe negative reviews (include experience of opportunistic behavior) rather than positive ones

[29]

.

Consumer would be less guilty and treat opportunistic behavior more common, if they see other behavior like
this.
H3: Consumers are more likely to claim opportunistically when they have heard the other consumer doing so.
For platform owners, one of their main obligations is monitoring participants to make sure the order and
discipline are established and maintain well

[30]

. Specifically, monitoring means the management methods

market owners take to “police” or “control” platforms to make sure no opportunistic behaviors including
“lying ,stealing, cheating, and calculated efforts to mislead, distort, disguise, obfuscate, or otherwise confuse”
will happen

[31]

. Monitoring process likely generates uncomfortable social pressures to comply with social

norms [32], while increase the ability of market owner to detect opportunistic behaviors [33].
H4： Consumers are more likely to claim opportunistically when platforms show a tolerant attitude.

Figure 1. Conceptual Model.
Solid lines show the hypothesized relationship; intermittent lines show the interaction effect which cannot be proved.

4.

METHOD AND ANALYSIS
Table 1 provides an overview of the four studies conducted as part of this research program. Study 1used

in-depth customer interviews to explore the most reasonable level of compensation and the main reason for
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opportunistic claiming behaviors. Study 2 to 4 followed up with experiments to directly test the hypotheses on
the perspective of compensation, platform attitude and reference group’s behavior.
Table 1. Research Program Overview
Method
Data and context

Sample size (N)
Hypothesized relationship with
opportunistic claiming
H1: Machiavellianism
H2: Compensation
H3: Platform attitude
H4: Reference group

Study 1
In-depth interview
Self-reported
claim
22 student
interviewees

Study 2
Questionnaire

Study 3
Experiment

Study 4
Experiment

Scenario set in a shoes purchase context
91 student
respondents

108 student
respondents

72 student
respondents and 161
working adult
respondents

Findings
√
-

√
√
-

√
√
√
-

√
√
√

Study 1- in depth interviews
In study 1, we conducted semi-structures in-depth interviews to find the possible reasons for consumer
opportunistic claiming behavior and the attitude toward compensation. 22 interviewees were approached
including 15 females and 7males and the age of respondents are ranged from 21 to 58 years. Responders were
recruited by their friends to facilitate an open and trusting interview atmosphere.

Compensation
Almost all the respondents regarded returning goods without charges of delivery as the most reasonable
compensation, but there still are few of them thought it is acceptable even asking the consumer to pay delivery
fee. In the term of over compensation, people view the mental compensation (e.g. apologize and follow-up
service) and the material compensation (e.g. cash and coupon) as the extra parts besides free shipping. Examples
of quotes featuring reasonable compensation are:
" ... What we only need is the free shipping for returning. We should not pay for examining the quality of
the goods by ourselves..." (Zhen, 26 years, graduate student)
" ... I do not care about the fee itself, but I think if the duty is belonging to sellers, it's better for them to pay
the bill." (Ding, 28 years, bank worker)
It is noticeable that some of interviewees calculated the cost of artificial handling such as time and energy
they spend on returning strategy into the reasonable compensation. So we control and minimize the effects of
artificial costs in later examination by using door-to-door service.

Moral attitude
The attitude towards opportunistic claiming can be divided into two groups. Someone think this kind of
cheating behavior is immoral, so they will never do it at all. The words they used were such as "wrong", "bad
manners" and "absolutely not". To the opposite, others argued that the opportunistic behavior is not illegal and
can bring benefits actually, so they want to try if possible. The examples are as following:
"It's immoral. It's cheating... Good guys never behave like that...I'll be shamed if my friends do such thing."
(Zhang, 58 years, Mechanical professor)
"It's a common phenomenon ... We, consumers, have right to do so if sellers make their promises... Why not?
If we can try the goods than decide whether we want pay for them..." (Du, 27 years, graduated student)
After interviews, we do MACH-IV test (20 items with 7-point Likert scale, and Cronbach's Alpha off all
the items was above 0.71) to measuring respondents' level of Machiavellianism, and find that the ones with
strict attitude towards opportunistic behavior are in lower level (Low Machs), while the ones with tolerate
attitude are in higher level (High Machs). In other words, the high level of Machiavellianism will be more likely
to claim in an opportunistic manner, supporting hypothesis 1.
Study 2- experiment on Machiavellianism
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However, the self-claiming method have limited that where are small size of samples (22 interviewees) or
respondents cannot explain their behavior clearly, so the decision making process had not been explored yet. To
test our conclusions stably and specifically, we designed Study 2.

Method
The questionnaire used in Study 2 adopted 5-point Likert scale (ranging from 1=strongly disagree,
5=strongly agree). To reduce potential social desirability biases, a scenario cum role-playing approach was used
providing respondents with a projective task [25]. The roleplaying scenario approach has been used in research on
unethical decision making and behavior in the past [5].
The questionnaire was divided into three parts. The first part of the questionnaire is scene instillation. We
assume individuals have a special requirement about spiked shoes because they will attend a 100-meter dash and
wish to win the competition. But they don’t have a pair of professional running shoes which are useless in other
occasion and also costly. Finally they decide to buy the ones in a middle-size online shop offering the
unconditional guarantee in platform A. The second part of the questionnaire aims to measure the possibility of
opportunistic claiming behavior. In this part, we adopted the Multidimensional Ethics Scale (MES)

[34]

. To

measure intention to take questionable actions (α=.889) and to cognitive the reasoning process using several
modes (e.g., justice, α=.911; utilitarianism, α=.665; and deontology, α=.783). The MES was proved to be
effective in moral reasoning not only for university students but also for professional life
the questionnaire is the scale of Mach Scale (IV) Likert-type scale

[25]

[34]

. The third part of

. According the result of pretext, we

reduce items from 20 to 7 for higher Cronbach's Alpha (.76).

Sample
The paper questionnaires were sent to 91 undergraduate students, with 100% usable feedbacks. 39% of the
respondents are male, and the age range was between 18 and 25 years old.
Table 3. ANOVA analysis between Low Machs and High Machs
Independent variables
Justice
Utilitarianism
Deontology
Opportunistic claiming

Machiavellianism
Low
High
Low
High
Low
High
Low
High

N
102
121
102
121
102
121
102
121

Mean
2.0752
2.7466
3.2745
3.3926
2.7549
3.2521
2.2353
2.9669

Std. Deviation
.90702
1.21870
1.07544
1.00459
1.04062
1.04308
.87231
1.09684

Sig.
.000***
.398 (n.s.)
.000***
.000***

*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05 Significance levels are for logistic regression and ANOVA analysis

Analysis and findings
We employed the logistic regression to explore the moral reasoning towards opportunistic claiming (see
Table 2) and the ANOVA analysis to administer the mechanism why the level of Machiavellianism can
significantly affect the probability of opportunistic manner (see Table 3).
Generally speaking, these three moral modes (p<0.001) and the level of Machiavellianism (p<0.01) all
have positive effects on opportunistic claiming. Firstly, if individuals believe that the returning behavior is
justice both for buyers and sellers and this manner is accepted by the common values, they will more likely to
do so. Secondly, the more benefits and fewer risks they receive, the higher possibility of opportunistic claiming
happened. People always maximize their own profits, so the higher perceived value will lead to higher return
rate. Thirdly, deontology is also considered by consumers. Unwritten contract and unspoken promise restrict
consumer behavior, so people will make unethical decision when they think it doesn’t broke social rules.
Finally, the result about Machiavellianism also supports H1 as Study 1. High Machs are more likely to do
opportunistic manner than Low Machs. The reasons of this phenomenon are showed in the outcomes of ANOVA
analysis (see Ttable 3). There are significant differences in justice (p<0.001), deontology (p<0.001) and
opportunistic claiming (p<0.001) when compared the higher level Machiavellianism to the lower level ones. The
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high group thinks the opportunistic claiming is more justice and deontological, because they are not sensitive to
guilt, shame or sympathy

[26]

. As a result, High Machs treat the returning behavior as a reasonable one, and will

adopt frequently. It is also noticeable that the difference in utilitarianism is not significant.
Study 3- experiment on compensation and platform
The first experiment was designed to test the effects of compensation offered by sellers (H2) and attitude
from platform (H3) on opportunistic claiming behavior.

Method
A 3 (compensation policy) ×2 (platform attitude) between-subjects factorial design was used. A scenario
cum role-playing approach was used in the same context of online shopping. But before the respondents get into
the scenario, there appeared news from authority site to announce the attitude of platform A. The strict one
described as platform want to take the serve measures to punish cheaters, while the tolerant one just said the
goal of this platform is protecting the rights of consumers.
On the other hand, compensation policy can be divided into three levels described in the scenario according
to the result from Study 1. The low level means service compensation without back shipping fee, while the high
level means the compensation are not only including the price of goods and shipping fee, but also offers a
coupon for next transaction. For the most reasonable level, the medium one means the compensation included
original cost and returning shipping fee.
The rest of the questionnaire is consisted with the scales of Machiavellianism and opportunistic claiming
intention which are same as the one appeared in Study 2.

Sample
We used online survey in Study 3, and designed the news part as a popup with a certain period to make
sure all the respondents read it. 108 useable responses were obtained including well-educated students. 63% of
the respondents are female, and the age range was between 18 and 25 years old.

Analysis and findings
Study 1 and 2 pointed that the reasoning process for Low Machs and High Machs are various, so in this
part we analysis the two different groups specifically. The individual’s Machiavellianism score above mean
value we call High Machs, while the ones with the fewer score than the mean value we call Low Machs. Then,
MANOVA is applied to explore the effects of compensation and platform attitude on the opportunistic claiming
behavior (see Table 4).
In the perspective of compensation, the results differ between the two groups. For the Low Machs group,
both compensation (F (2,108) =3.6, p< .05,

low=1.9,

medium=2.5,

high=2.3)

and platform attitude had significant

main effects on opportunistic behavior. But no interaction effect reached significance in the MAVONA. The
reasonable compensation can balance the guilt for the extra compensation and the risk for the lack of guarantee,
so they can easily behave opportunistically. They may feel more comfortable and unrestrained when they meet
the sellers take medium level of compensation strategy. As to the High Machs group, only compensation
reached significance (F (2,108) =2.632, p< .10,

low=3.2,

medium=2.9,

high=3.1).

However, unlike the situation

for the Low Machs, the reasonable compensation will bring less opportunistic behavior. The reason is that High
Machs have less sense of guilt, shame or sympathy and recognize the dark side of the society more clearly, so
they are not sensitive to the extra gifts or unexpected risks.
In the perspective of platform, policy or announcement took by platforms to avoid and warn the unethical
manners are useful only for Low Machs (F (2,108) = 3.9, p< .05,

strict =

2.0,

tolerate=2.5).

The ones with higher
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moral standard care more about the social rules, so they will have stronger pressures if they want to returning
goods with personal reasons. To the contrast, High Machs focus on building their own wealthy and are
regardless of moral condemnation; as a result, they would ignore the attitude of platforms unless there are
relative laws.
Table 4. MANOVA results on opportunistic claiming
Independent variables

F
2.727
3.600
3.871
.711

Machiavellianism
Compensation
Platform Attitude
Compensation * Platform Attitude

Low level
df
1
2
2
4

Sig.
.103
.031**
.022**
.587

F
13.973
2.632
.098
.292

High level
df
1
2
2
4

Sig.
.000***
.078*
.907
.882

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10 Significance levels are for MANOVA analysis

Study 4 ---experiment on reference group
In Study 4, we add the factor of reference group into the research model (H4). In Study 3, all the samples
came from university, so we re-test the effects of compensation again in this part to make the conclusion stable.

Method and sample
A 3 (compensation policy) ×2 (platform attitude) between-subjects factorial design was used. The online
shopping context and the manipulations of compensation are same as Study 3. At this time we used other two
pieces of online news, one is about appearance of “ward robing” in platform A and the other one is unconcerned
content. A total 223 responses were obtained including 72 students and 161 working adults.

Data and analysis
The results of MANOVA shows (see Table 5) that service compensation can affect opportunistic claiming
significantly for Low Machs (F (2,223) =3.95, p< .05,

low=1.9,

medium=2.7,

high=2.1),

supporting H2 too. But

the effects for high Machs were not that significant, although the trend appeared in the same way (F (2,223)
=.735, p>.10,

low=3,

medium=2.6,

high=2.8).

In the aspect of reference group, it performed well only in the group of Low Machs (F (2,223) =7.114,
p< .011,

reference=2.6,

other=1.8).

Specifically, people had seen the news about other consumer’s opportunistic

manner can be more likely to imitate and repeat this bad manner, because of conformist mentality. For the
consumer who never heard about the cheating way to gain profits, would start to try, while consumer who have
done the bad manners before may subconsciously rationalize their behavior and feel less guilt. However,
individuals in the group of High Machs are not affected by reference group, because they are more self-centered
and careless about other’s decisions. High Machs prefer guiding or leading others to being influenced.
Also, there is no interaction effect.
Table 5 MANOVA results on opportunistic claiming
Independent variables
Machiavellianism
Compensation
Reference Group
Compensation * Reference Group

F
.004
3.95
7.114
.094

Low level
df
1
2
1
2

Sig.
.947
.027**
.011**
.911

F
8.578
.735
.284
.545

High level
df
1
2
1
2

Sig.
.005***
.485
.597
.584

*** p<0.01；** p<0.05； * p<0.10 Significance levels are for MANOVA analysis

5. CONCLUSION
Despite opportunistic behavior of consumer is common these days, the factors contributing to this
phenomenon have drawn little attention especially on the context of service guarantee. In the current study, we
address this gap theoretically and empirically. We adopt 4 Studies to explore the effects of three important parts
of two-sided market: sellers (compensation), buyers (Machiavellianism and reference group) and platforms
(platform attitude) on the opportunistic claiming behavior. The findings are as follows: 1) consumers with
higher level of Machiavellianism are more likely to claim in an opportunistic manner, because they are less
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sensitive to guilt and more self-centeredness. 2) The effects of compensation saw an opposite trend for different
levels of Machiavellianism. The reasonable compensation (here refers to returning goods without shipping fee)
would evoke the desire to do cheating behavior for Low Machs, while reduce the probability of opportunistic
claiming behavior for High Machs. Both platform attitude and reference group have no significant influence on
High Machs. Specifically, 3) platform with tolerant attitude would face to more opportunistic claims and 4)
reference group’s opportunistic manners would increase the number of opportunists only for the Low Machs.

Managerial implication
According to the findings, a good rule of thumb for sellers would be to offer different service guarantees to
different consumers. For the valued and good quality clients, the compensation can be more generous, because
their will have a good impression on the shop while do nothing to cheat guarantees. On the contrast, the
consumer with bad transaction record should better to be treated with the rational generous service guarantee.
In our study, opportunistic claiming was not only driven by consumer themselves and sellers, but also by
the contextual variables of two-sided market. For the managers of platforms, the preceding conclusions suggest
that strict policies and measurements should be applied to avoid opportunistic claims. For example, the
“blacklist” of jay consumers can be used to monitor and trace their behavior, and some special strategies should
be taken to restrict their purchase. However, the news about the opportunistic phenomenon should not be
announced or discussed in the public, because it would guide innocent consumers imitate or try bad manners.

Limits and further direction
We are also aware of some limitation in this research. Firstly, the sample size of these four studies and the
projective role-playing method we applied might reduce the power of our findings. So the secondary data or the
information observed directly is necessary in later study. Secondly, the approaches platforms can affect users’
opportunistic behavior are limited in this paper. For further study, the comparison between various policies is
worth to explore. Thirdly, the relationship between the consumer and reference group also play a crucial role in
this field. The closer friends can affect more than strangers in traditional context, but is it true in the context of
opportunistic claiming? We hope future study will extend this research program and explore from a new sight.
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